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TAXPAYER-INITIATED CHANGE FROM IMPROPER TO
PROPER METHOD OF ACCOUNTING
Witte v. Commissioner, 513 F.2d 391 (D.C. Cir. 1975)
Petitioner, a cash receipts and disbursements taxpayer,1 reported
income in 1962-1964 from installment payments on land sales con-
tracts.2 Petitioner used the "cost recovery" method' of reporting and
claimed capital gains treatment for the entire amount of the payments.4
1. Methods of accounting are set out in the Treasury Regulations to INT. Rnv.
CODE OF 1954, § 446:
(1) Cash receipts and disbursements method. Generally, under the cash re-
ceipts and disbursements method in the computation of taxable income, all
items which constitute gross income (whether in the form of cash, property,
or services) are to be included for the taxable year in which actually or con-
structively received. Expenditures are to be deducted for the taxable year in
which actually made....
Treas. Reg. § 1.446-1(c) (i) (1957).
2. Taxpayer purchased unimproved real property that he subsequently subdivided
into 20 acre parcels. He sold these parcels in 1956 and 1957 under contracts that
provided for a ten percent down payment and principal and interest payments of one
percent of the sales price per month until the balance of the purchase price was paid.
Herbert S. Witte, 41 P-H Tax Ct. Mem. 1186, 1188 (1972).
3. In sales of real property involving deferred payments:
if the obligations received by the vendor have no fair market value, the pay-
ments in cash or other property having a fair market value shall be applied
against and reduce the basis of the property sold and, if in excess of such basis,
shall be taxable to the extent of the excess. Gain or loss is realized when the
obligations are disposed of or satisfied, the amount thereof being the difference
between the reduced basis as provided in the preceding sentence and the amount
realized therefor. Only in rare and extraordinary cases does property have no
fair market value.
Treas. Reg. § 1.453-6(a) (2) 1958 (emphasis added).
Taxpayer had initially reported no gain on the sales, but applied the downpayment and
installment payments toward the recovery of his basis. Once his basis was recovered he
reported the full amount of subsequent installment payments as gain. Herbert S. Witte,
41 P-H Tax Ct. Mem. 1186, 1190 (1972).
Section 1.453-6 applies to cash basis taxpayers reporting income from installment sales
not on the installment method. Although the regulation is worded without reference to
the taxpayer's accounting method, it is not entirely clear that it applies to accrual method
taxpayers. Compare C.W. Titus, Inc., 33 B.T.A. 928, 930, nonacquiescence XV-1 Cum.
BULL. 46 (1936), appeal dismissed, 88 F.2d 1007 (10th Cir. 1937), with Western Oaks
Building Corp., 49 T.C. 365, 372 (1968) and Harold W. Johnston, 14 T.C. 560, 565
(1950). The Tax Court in George L. Caster Co., 30 T.C. 1061, 1068 (1958),
held that the predecessor of § 1.453-6(a) (1) was in any event inapplicable to sales of
personal property.
4. Taxpayer asserted that INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 1237 permitted him to use
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The Commissioner determined that the payments were taxable at ordi-
nary rates,5 and assessed a deficiency. Taxpayer then asserted, and the
Commissioner agreed, that the "cost recovery" method was improper and
the "completed transaction" method6 was proper under the circum-
stances. 7 The Commissioner insisted, however, that taxpayer could not
change his method of reporting the payments without first obtaining his
consent under section 446(e) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954.1
The Tax Court determined that because taxpayer was merely correct-
ing an error section 446(e) did not apply, and allowed taxpayer to
make the change without consent of the Commissioner."0 The United
the cost recovery method but he later abandoned this claim. 41 P-H Tax Ct. Mem. at
1191 n.4.
5. The Commissioner determined that part of the income was interest income and
the rest was ordinary income from sales of land held primarily for sale. Id. at 1190. See
TNT. REv. CODE OF 1954, §1221(1).
6. See Treas. Reg. § 1.453-6(a)(1) (1958):
(1) In ... sales of real property involving deferred payments in which
the payments received during the year of sale exceed 30 percent of the selling
price, the obligations of the purchaser received by the vendor are to be con-
sidered as an amount realized to the extent of their fair market value in
ascertaining the profit or loss from the transactions ....
7. The Tax Court determined that the fair market value of each of the contracts
at the time of sale was "75 percent of its face amount." 41 P-H Tax Ct. Mem. at 1192.
Thus, applying Treas. Reg. § 1.453-6(a) (1958), quoted in note 6 supra, the part of
the sales price representing unreported gain, 25 percent, was used as the percentage
multiplier of subsequent payments to determine the gain reported in the year of
payment. The part of the payment not so reported, 75 percent, was regarded as return
of investment. 41 P-H Tax Ct. Mem. at 1192.
8. 41 P-H Tax Ct. Mem. at 1191. INT. REv. CoDn oF 1954, § 446(e):
Requirement respecting change of accounting method.-Except as otherwise
expressly provided in this chapter, a taxpayer who changes the method of ac-
counting on the basis of which he regularly computes his income in keeping
his books shall, before computing his taxable income under the new method,
secure the consent of the Secretary or his delegate.
9. 41 P-H Tax Ct. Mem. at 1193. Taxpayers and the Commissioner have long
battled over what is a "correction of error" as opposed to a "change in accounting
method." See, e.g., Hulond R. Ryan, 42 T.C. 386, 393 (1964), and cases cited therein.
See also Skinner, Recent Tax Accounting Developments, 42 TAXES 836, 837 (1964);
Mills, Correction of Error v. Change of Accounting Method: How This Conflict is Be-
ing Handled, 22 J. TAX. 66 (Feb. 1965). In 1970 the Commissioner listed those kinds
of changes that the Service considers "corrections of errors" and provided a new guide-
line for determining "change of accounting method." Treas. Reg. § 1.446-1(e) (2) (ii)
(b) (1970). See note 21 infra.
10. This determination greatly reduced taxpayer's tax liability. See note 33 infra.
The Tax Court relied on two cases, Thompson-King-Tate, Inc. v. United States, 296
F.2d 290 (6th Cir. 1961), and Howard H. Perelman, 41 T.C. 234 (1963), in addition
to Wingate E. Underhill, 45 T.C. 489 (1966), see note 18 infra, to support its conclu-
sion. In Perelman, however, the court held that the Commissioner could not require con-
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States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia, after finding that
the change of reporting method was a change of accounting method, 1
reversed and held: Under section 466(e), a taxpayer may not change
from an improper to a proper method of accounting without the Com-
missioner's consent. 12
Section 446(e) requires taxpayers to obtain the consent of the Com-
missioner before changing methods of accounting, so that the Commis-
sioner can make any adjustments 3 necessary to prevent "distortions of
income" that might arise from a change.'4 Although Congress in its
snt under section 446(e) "since he was the one who caused the change to be made."
41 T.C. at 242. In Thompson-King-Tate the taxpayer for two years had deviated from
the method of accounting he had elected to use. The court concluded that since taxpay-
er's deviation had been without the Commissioner's consent it was an error that he could
correct. The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia distinguished these cases ob-
serving that neither involved a taxpayer who sought to "deviate from his long-standing
albeit erroneous accounting method without obtaining permission from the Commis-
sioner." Witte v. Commissioner, 513 F.2d 391, 394 n.5 (D.C. Cir. 1975).
11. Witte v. Commissioner, 513 F.2d 391, 393 (D.C. Cir. 1975).
12. ld. at 394.
13. Treas. Reg. § 1.446-1(e)(3)(i) (1957) provides:
Permission to change a taxpayer's method of accounting will not be granted
unless the taxpayer and the Commissioner agree to the terms, conditions, and
adjustments under which the change will be effected. See section 481 and the
regulations thereunder, relating to certain adjustments required by such
changes, section 472 and the regulations thereunder, relating to changes to and
from the last-in, first-out method of inventorying goods, and section 453 and
the regulations thereunder, relating to certain adjustments required by a change
from an accrual method to the installment method.
Requests to change methods of accounting are "ordinarily" favorably received. Ad-
justments are generally made over a ten-year period. Rev. Proc. 70-27, 1970-2 CuM.
BULL. 509. In any event, taxpayers are entitled to a three-year allocation (two-year
spreadback) under INT. Ray. CODE OF 1954, § 481(b).
14. The reason for [§ 466(e)] is that a change in an accounting method will fre-
quently cause a distortion of taxable income in the year of change; therefore,
the Commissioner is empowered to prevent such distortion and consequent
windfall to the taxpayer by conditioning his consent on the taxpayer's accept-
ance of adjustments that would eliminate any distortion.
Woodward Iron Co. v. United States, 396 F.2d 552, 554 (5th Cir. 1968) (emphasis
added). See Treas. Reg. §§ 1.446-1(c)(2)(ii), (e)(2), (e)(3) (1970). See also Ameri-
can Can Co. v. Commissioner, 317 F.2d 604 (2d Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 993
(1964); Commissioner v. 0. Liquidating Corp., 292 F.2d 225 (3d Cir.), cert. denied,
368 U.S. 898 (1961); Hackensack Water Co. v. United States, 352 F.2d 807 (Ct. C1.
1965); Advertisers Exchange, Inc., 25 T.C. 1086 (1956), affd per curiam, 240 F.2d
958 (2d Cir. 1957). Skinner explained:
When a change of method of accounting is made, recurring items of income
and expense are taken into account during the year of change under the new
method, whether or not they have been previously taken into account during
Washington University Open Scholarship
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report accompanying the Revenue Act of 1954 stated that "method of
accounting"'" in section 446(e) refers not only to the taxpayer's gen-
eral plan of accounting, but also to his treatment of a material item, 16
courts initially were hesitant to accept such a broad definition.17  In
1957, however, the Commissioner stated that section 446(e) did apply
to the treatment of material items,' 8 and eventually the courts uni-
formly concurred. 19 Still, prior to 1970 neither the Commissioner nor
the courts had defined "material item," although decisions indicated
that the essence of the test for materiality was quantity.20 In 1970, the
a prior taxable year under the old method. For 1954 and subsequent years,
special technical rules have been added to the Code to prevent a doubling up
or an omission of items of income or deduction in cases involving changes in
accounting method.
Skinner, supra note 9, at 837. See also 303 TAx MANAGEMENT PORTFOLIoS A-12 (1974).
15. The issue whether a taxpayer's change in reporting procedure is a change in
method of accounting (and the subissue whether a material item is involved) also arises
in cases involving § 481(a). Section 481(a) provides that when taxable income for
any year covered by the 1954 Code is computed under a method of accounting different
from the method under which income was computed for the preceding year, there shall
be taken into account those adjustments determined to be necessary solely by reason of
the change in order to prevent amounts from being duplicated or omitted. Adjustments
for pre-1954 Code years are taken into account only if the taxpayer initiated the change.
There is no difference in the courts' treatment of these issues; § 446(e) is the "comple-
mentary provision" of § 481(a). H.F. Campbell Co., 53 T.C. 439, 447 (1969), supple-
mented, 54 T.C. 1021 (1970).
16. S. REP. No. 1622, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 300 (1954).
17. See American Can Co., 37 T.C. 198 (1961), rev'd in part, 317 F.2d 604 (2d
Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 993 (1964); 0. Liquidating Corp., 29 P-H Tax Ct.
Mem. 178 (1960), rev'd, 292 F.2d 225 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 898 (1961); Ad-
vertisers Exchange, Inc., 25 T.C. 1086 (1956), aff'd per curiam, 240 F.2d 958 (2d Cir.
1957); Falk, Definitions of Accounting Method: Reevaluation in Light of American
Can Company and Other Recent Decisions, N.Y.U. 23d INsT. ON FED. TAx. 787 (1965).
18. Treas. Reg. § 1.446-1(e)(2)(ii) (1957).
19. See generally 2 J. MERTFNs, LAw OF FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION § 12.19, at 100
(1974), citing, e.g., Graff Chevrolet Co. v. Campbell, 343 F.2d 568 (5th Cir. 1965)
(applying § 481, see note 15 supra); Broida, Stone & Thomas, Inc. v. United States, 204
F. Supp. 841 (N.D. W. Va.), aff'd per curiam, 309 F.2d 486 (4th Cir. 1962); George C.
Carlson, 36 P-H Tax Ct. Mem. 583 (1967).
20. See Woodward Iron Co. v. United States, 396 F.2d 552 (5th Cir. 1968) (state
property tax deduction of $187,476.20); American Can Co. v. Commissioner, 317 F.2d
604, 606 (2d Cir. 1963), rev'g in part, 37 T.C. 198 (1961), (vacation payments, $5,853,-
970.70; state property tax expense, $1,546,751.42; case under the 1939 Code involving
Treas. Reg. 118, § 39.41-2(c) (1938), the predecessor of § 446(e)); Commissioner v. 0.
Liquidating Corp., 292 F.2d 225, 230 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 898 (1961) (in-
surance dividends, $114,117.44); Irvine v. United States, 212 F. Supp. 937, 941 (D. Wyo.
1963) (inventory of livestock; no amount given); Broida, Stone & Thomas, Inc. v. United
States, 204 F. Supp. 841, 843 (N.D. W. Va.), affd per curiam, 309 F.2d 486 (4th Cir.
1962) ($6,660 item that would add ten percent to taxable income); H.F. Campbell Co.,https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol1975/iss4/6
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Commissioner promulgated regulations that defined "material item" in
terms of the proper time for including the item in income. 1
Although courts often ruled that changes from improper to proper
methods of accounting required the Commissioner's consent,22 Wingate
53 T.C. 439, 446 (1969), supplemented 54 T.C. 1021 (1970) (profit or loss from long
term contracts, $145,937.27; a § 481(a) case); George C. Carlson, P-H Tax Ct. Mem.
583, 585 (1967) ($6,920 in license fees constituting 8.5% of total income); Hulond R.
Ryan, 42 T.C. 386, 393 (1964) (dealer reserve account, $117,720.61; a § 481(a) case);
Fruehauf Trailer Co., 42 T.C. 83, 104 (1964), aff'd, 356 F.2d 975 (6th Cir.), cert.
denied, 385 U.S. 822 (1966) (change in trailer inventory treatment resulting in tax
difference of $5,632,533.86; a § 481(a) case), noted in DeLeoleos, Accounting Method
Changes: Freuhauf Trailer May Limit IRS Compromise Procedure, 20 J. TAxAoN 322
(June 1964); Dorr-Oliver, Inc., 40 T.C. 50, 55 (1963) (vacation pay expenses,
$4,908.23); Wright Contracting Co., 36 T.C. 620 (1961), affd, 316 F.2d 249 (5th
Cir.), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 879 (1963) (retainers for two years of $265,762.19 and
$101,816.72; a § 39.41-2(c) case).
But see Cincinnati, N.O. & Tex. Pac. Ry. Co. v. United States, 424 F.2d 563, 570 (Ct.
Cl. 1970) (finding difference in reported income of $54,004, which represented 6/100 of
one percent of taxpayer's operating expenses, not material).
2 1. "A material item is any item which involves the proper time for the inclusion of
the item in income or the taking of a deduction." Treas. Reg. § 1.446-1(e)(2)(ii)
(1970).
At the January 22, 1969, IRS hearing on the proposed § 446(e) regulations the
American Institute of Certified Public Accountants voiced its disapproval of this defini-
tion and recommended that the definition be expressed, like the judicial standard, in
terms of amount. The Institute
suggested that an item be considered immaterial if the adjustment to make the
change is less than $3,000, or if the adjustment is less than the greater of (a)
I per cent of the gross income for the taxable year or (b) 5 per cent of the
average taxable income for the five preceding years. In any event an adjust-
ment of $250,000 or more will be considered material.
What's a Change in Method of Accounting?, 127 J. ACCOUNTANCY 72, 73 (1969). Since
Congress provided no guidance as to what it meant by "material item," it is understand-
able that a controversy like this might arise. The common meaning of "material" sug-
gests a definition like the Institute's. Although the Commissioner's definition is also
plausible and fits within the meaning of "material," it merely incorporates the concept
of distortion of income, which the courts have long understood to be the subject of §
446(e), and thus adds nothing to the section. The Institute's definition has the virtue
of adding a lower limit to the dollar amount of items which need be subjected to the
trial of § 446(e); this should reduce the large accounting and administrative burden that
seems to be necessitated by the Commissioner's definition with relatively little detriment
to the revenues.
22. See, e.g., American Can Co. v. Commissioner, 317 F.2d 604, 606 (2d Cir.
1963), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 993 (1964); Commissioner v. 0. Liquidating Corp., 292
F.2d 225, 230 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 898 (1961); Broida, Stone & Thomas,
Inc. v. United States, 204 F. Supp. 841, 843 (N.D. W. Va.), affd per curiam, 309 F.2d
486 (4th Cir. 1962); Hackensack Water Co. v. United States, 352 F.2d 807, 810 (Ct. Cl.
1965); John P. Bongiovanni, P-H Tax Ct. Mem. 1182, 1184 (1971), rev'd on other
grounds, 470 F.2d 921 (2d Cir. 1972); Wright Contracting Co., 36 T.C. 620, 636
(1961), a! 'd, 316 F.2d 249 (5th Cir. 1963); Advertisers Exchange, Inc., 25 T.C. 1086,
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E. UnderhilI23 pointed out a possible method of circumventing that rule.
The Underhill court had to decide whether the taxpayer could change
without consent from the completed transaction method of reporting
installment payments to the cost recovery method.24  Instead of focus-
ing on the taxpayer's reporting procedure, the court dismissed the
"subtleties of 'method of accounting'" and stated that the issue turned
on the character of payments, that is, "the extent to which the
payments. . . are taxable or nontaxable . ... ,, On that basis the
Tax Court held that taxpayer was simply correcting an error and
allowed the change without consent.20
Witte v. Commissioner2 7 presented the same issue in a comparable
factual context. The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
decided the materiality issue by applying both the quantity test
1092 (1956), aff'd per curiam, 240 F.2d 958 (2d Cir. 1957) (application of INT. REV.
CODE OF 1939, §§ 41, 42).
23. 45 T.C. 489 (1966).
24. Taxpayer's income in question was from regular payments on notes secured by
deeds of trust on real estate. Id. at 490. The change that Underhill sought to make was
precisely the reverse of the change that the taxpayer in Witte had sought to make. See
text accompanying notes 1 & 2 supra.
25. Id. at 496. The Underhill court provided little explanation for the way in which
it framed the issue except to state:
We are not persuaded that this case involves a situation where the respondent's
consent to a change of reporting should be required under section 446(e) to
insure that there will not be a distortion of income "to the detriment of the
government."
Id. at 497.
26. Id. See also Thompson-King-Tate, Inc. v. United States, 296 F.2d 290, 294 (6th
Cir. 1961) (taxpayer who elected method which his accountant applied erroneously; tax-
payer allowed to correct error); Beacon Pub. Co. v. Commissioner, 218 F.2d 697, 702
(10th Cir. 1955), rev'g 21 T.C. 610 (1954) ("[A] taxpayer may, without the consent of
the Commissioner, apply the method of accounting which he has adopted, though not
theretofore applied to a particular item, when that change will correct errors and clearly
reflect income"); Robert M. Foley, 56 T.C. 765, 769 (1911) (taxpayer allowed to
change from method that Commissioner disallowed "in the first instance" to permissible
method, i.e., change must be from a regular method to call for application of § 446(e));
Silver Queen Motel, 55 T.C. 1101, 1105 (1971) (same); North Carolina Granite Corp.,
43 T.C. 149, 167 (1964) (taxpayer omitted his inventory in calculating depletion with
result that calculation fluctuated drastically year to year; this fluctuation was "tanta-
mount to mathematical errors" on the part of taxpayer which he could correct). Beacon
Pub. Co. v. Commissioner, supra, is "not being followed by the Service." Rev. Rul. 59-
285, 1959-2 CuM. BuLL. 458, 460. Undoubtedly, the Commissioner considers the "par-
ticular item" language of Beacon (quoted above) as running directly against the "mate-
rial item" application of § 446(e).
27. 513 F.2d 391 (D.C. Cir. 1975).
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developed in earlier cases' s and the timing test of the new regulations.2 9
In reaching its decision the court provided no convincing reasons for
holding that the tests for materiality were met. The court distinguished
Underhill on the ground that the Tax Court had dealt with the charac-
ter of payments rather than "the proper method or time of reporting an
item the character of which [was] not in question."30  The court then
cited with approval the 1970 Regulations that state that even if a
taxpayer has adopted an erroneous treatment of a material item, a
"change in such practice or procedure is a change of method of account-
ing."" The court concluded that its decision was consistent with the
policy underlying section 446(e)-the prevention of distortions of in-
come 2 -since taxpayer would have avoided taxes barred by the statute
of limitations."3  The court's policy argument was strong. Section
446(e) is based upon the objective of preventing income distortions
of the kind that taxpayer's change would have produced. 4
The court, however, failed to consider several problems. First, the
Witte court made no reference to the disparity between the quantity and
timing tests of materiality. 35 Second, although it applied the quantity
28. Id. at 393; see note 20 supra and accompanying text.
29. 513 F.2d at 393; see note 21 supra and accompanying text.
30. 513 F.2d at 393 n.5, quoting Wingate E. Underhill, 45 T.C. at 489, 496 (1966).
31. Treas. Reg. § 1.446-1(e)(2)(iii) (example 7) (1970); Treas. Reg. § 1.446-
1 (e) (2) (i) (iii) (example 8) (1970).
32. 513 F.2d at 395.
33. Those years when taxpayer was "recovering his basis" and paying no tax at all
were closed except to the extent that the provisions of §§ 1311-1315 of the Code were
applicable. See Herbert S. Witte, 41 P-H Tax Ct. Mem. 1186, 1193 n.7; Brief for
Appellant at 14 n.5, Witte v. Commissioner, 513 F.2d 391 (D.C. Cir. 1975). Sections
1311-15 require adjustments in certain instances in which an error has been corrected.
If the taxpayer had prevailed on his "correction of error" theory, the Commissioner
could have asserted § 1312(3) (B) as authority for an adjustment under § 1314. Such an
adjustment, however, would have been limited under § 1311(b) (a) (A) to those years
not yet barred by the limitations provision of the Code, §§ 6501-33. Section 6501
might have prevented the Commissioner from reaching any year more than three years
before the contested year. In Witte the Commissioner could have reached back only to
taxpayer's 1962 tax return; the contracts of sale were in 1956 and 1957. See Herbert S.
Witte, 41 P-H Tax Ct. Mem. 1186, 1190 (1972).
34. See note 14 supra and accompanying text.
35. Treas. Reg. § 1.446-1(e)(2)(ii)(b) (1970) provides examples of changes that
do not involve
the proper time nor the inclusion of the item in income or the taking of a de-
duction. For example, correction of items that are deducted as interest or sal-
ary, but which are in fact payments of dividends and of items that are deducted
as business expenses, but which are in fact personal expenses, are not changes
in the method of accounting.
These examples illustrate that by the regulation's definition changes in the procedure ofWashington University Open Scholarship
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test, the court offered no indication of the minimum measure of materi-
ality,16 duplicating a similar failing in other opinions on the issue.17
Third, merely reciting that Underhill had dealt with the "character of
payments" did little to distinguish the cases. If that rationale was a
valid basis for the Underhill holding, it is unclear why the Witte court
rejected its application to the facts before it. The issue in both cases
was whether a taxpayer could change from an incorrect to a correct
method of reporting installment payments without obtaining the Com-
missioner's consent. If the significant difference is that the change
in reporting methods in Witte was the reverse of that in Underhill,
the Witte court did not explain why this difference is sufficient to
lead to an opposite result.38  The court did point out one additional
basis for distinguishing the cases: in Underhill there was no danger of
"distortion of income 'to the detriment of the government.' "80 In light
of the purpose of section 446(e), this distinction is perhaps the most
relevant, but it does not explain why taxpayer's change in Underhill
was not a change in the method of accounting.
Although the Witte decision is correct because it faithfully im-
plements Code policy,40 the failure of the court to deal with issues
that needed clarification is disappointing. By employing both the
quantity and timing tests of materiality with little accompanying
reasoning, the court implied that both must be applied to determine
whether an item is material. This procedure would, however, restrict
the scope of the timing test to items embraced by the quantity test.
It is doubtful that the Commissioner intended this result when he
reporting "material items" involve duplications or omissions, that is, distortions, no
matter what the size of the item. In contrast, by the court definition -"material items"
do not necessarily involve distortions because the critical factor is amount.
36. Perhaps the courts believe that materiality cannot be measured by a mechanical
standard, but that all surrounding circumstances must be considered in the determination.
Nonetheless, the courts have given no reasons for their failure to provide a standard.
37. See cases cited note 20 supra.
38. One theory suggested by the Commissioner was based upon the premise that §
446(e) is one of the "recognition" provisions of the Code. These provisions provide that
unrealized or still uncertain gain may not be taxed:
Underhill in allowing the change from pro rata reporting to the cost recovery
method implicitly held that the Commissioner could not force taxpayer to con-
tinue to recognize unrealized gain simply because he had erroneously reported
a part of such unrealized gains.
Brief for Appellant at 16, Witte v. Commissioner, 513 F.2d 391 (D.C. Cir. 1975).
39. See Witte v. Commissioner, 513 F.2d 393, 396 n.5 (D.C. Cir. 1975).
40. See note 14 supra.
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promulgated the 1970 Regulations. Also, since it held that a change
of reporting method was a change in the method of accounting, the
court should have overruled Underhill rather than distinguished it.41
41. The Commissioner argued that if Underhill held that the method of reporting
installment payments from the sale of property is not a method of accounting, Underhill
ibould be overruled. Brief for Appellant at 15, Witte v. Commissioner, 513 F.2d 391
(D.C. Cir. 1975).
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